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1 Introduction
The real value of a contract lies beyond its financial components: the degree to which the
parties are compatible also matters. According to a KPMG study, “83% of all mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) failed to produce any benefit for the shareholders and over half actually
destroyed value.” Interviews of over 100 senior executives revealed that the overwhelming
cause of failure “is the people and the cultural differences” (Gitelson et al., 2001).
Compatibility between a buyer and seller matters for more than just mergers and ac-
quisitions. It is an issue in publishing and team sports as well: a good match between an
author and his editor may generate a better book, and an athletic team is more likely to
win games if the players have compatible skills. Given the impact of matching on contract
value, it is not surprising that we observe sellers using matching as a factor in their choice of
buyer. During the 2002 auction for the rights to his second novel, Charles Frazier, author of
Cold Mountain, asserted that “money was not the only consideration and that he was keen
to choose the right editor to help him shape the book from the beginning” (Gumbel, 2002).
Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petro´leos de Venezuela (PDVSA), accounted for tech-
nological compatibility when it selected private partners for the development of marginal
fields in the early 1990s (Chalot, 1996).
In this paper, we consider a setting in which a good match raises the value of the contract
for both the seller and bidder but information about the quality of the match is incomplete.
In particular, we assume each bidder is better informed about the quality of his match
with the seller than the seller is. The paper begins by examining whether it is in the seller’s
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interest to use matching as a factor in his allocation decision. It is shown that once the reserve
price is set, the seller need not account for matching in his allocation decision; that is, the
seller behaves optimally by doing away with any matching considerations and allocating the
contract on the basis of price alone.
We then turn our attention to the issue of commitment. A seller is said to have commit-
ment power if he can allocate the contract in accordance with the allocation rule announced
at the outset of the auction – even when he prefers a different allocation after observing
the bids. In contrast, a seller without commitment power cannot refrain from allocating
the contract to the bidder whose combination of bid payment and expected match is most
attractive. It is shown that if matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal
mechanism can be implemented without commitment. However, if matching is not impor-
tant, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The lesser the importance of
matching, the greater the magnitude of the loss.
A stylized model is developed in which a single seller seeks to contract with one of several
bidders. Each pairing of seller and bidder is characterized by a match. The better the match,
the more each party values the contract. Each bidder observes his match with the seller (but
not the matches of his opponents with the seller). In contrast, the seller does not observe
his matches with the bidders.1
1The reader will note that the notion of matching advanced here is different from the notion advanced in
the two-sided matching literature (e.g., Gale and Shapley, 1962). While the latter use the term to refer to
the pairing of agents in a two-sided market, our paper uses the term to refer to the compatibility between
a bidder and seller. Since this compatibility induces a positive correlation between the valuations of the
bidder and seller, our notion of matching is more closely related to the literatures on affiliated values (e.g.,
Milgrom and Weber, 1982) and interdependent valuations (e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001), but while
these literatures are more concerned with linking the bidders’ valuations, our paper focuses on linking the
valuations of the bidder and seller.
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We solve for the optimal mechanism and find that it can be implemented via a standard
first-price auction with an appropriate choice of reserve price. Since a better match implies
a higher contract value, well matched bidders face a higher opportunity cost of not raising
their bids. As a result, bids increase in match. By awarding the contract to the highest
bidder, the seller finds himself automatically contracting with the best matched bidder.
To the extent that the seller allocates the contract to the bidder who submits the highest
price offer, the seller need not account for matching in his allocation decision. However,
matching does factor into the reserve price prescribed by the optimal mechanism. As is
generally the case, the optimal reserve price is artificially high: allocative efficiency is sacri-
ficed in favor of extracting informational rents. Introducing matching into the seller’s utility
function affects this trade-off, thereby inducing a corresponding adjustment in the optimal
reserve price relative to the standard independent private values framework. Hence, the
seller should account for matching in setting the reserve price, but once the reserve price is
set, the seller can do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on
the basis of price alone.
The question naturally arises: can the optimal mechanism be implemented without com-
mitment? In order to answer this question, we examine the equilibria of a first-score auction.
In a first-score auction, each bidder submits a price offer. After observing these offers, the
seller updates his beliefs about the quality of his match with each of the bidders and iden-
tifies the bidder whose combination of price and expected match is most attractive. If the
seller expects that contracting with that bidder will yield as much utility as not contracting
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at all, the contract is awarded to that bidder.2 Since this allocation rule reflects the seller’s
true preferences, there should be no incentive for the seller to deviate from the rule ex post.
We find that the equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-score auction are identical
to those in the first-price auction. In a first-score auction, well matched bidders have an
incentive to convey their information to the seller in order to raise their probability of
winning. Since well matched bidders have a higher value for the contract, they can credibly
signal their favorable matches by raising their bids beyond the point at which it is profitable
for poorly matched bidders to mimic them.3 Given that higher bids signal better matches,
the contract goes to the bidder submitting the highest bid – which is precisely the allocation
rule in a first-price auction.
We then address the feasibility of adhering to the prescribed reserve price. We find that
in order to sustain an elevated reserve price, the seller must (1) associate bids that fall short
of the reserve with a poor match and (2) find contracting with a poorly matched bidder to be
sufficiently unfavorable. When these two conditions are met, the seller prefers retaining the
contract to contracting with a bidder whose bid does not meet the reserve. It follows that if
2Che (1993), Branco (1997), Zheng (2000), and Asker and Cantillon (2008) analyze a similar auction
format in which the winning bidder is selected on the basis of price and quality. But while the bidders in
these papers bid directly on both factors, the bidders in our paper bid only on price, leaving the seller to
estimate the quality of the matches on his own. The mechanism in our paper is more closely linked to the
biased procurement problem studied by Rezende (forthcoming), in which each bidder submits a price offer
and the seller selects the winner on the basis of both price and some pre-existing bias. But while the bias
in Rezende’s paper is determined by the seller’s private information, the bias in our paper is determined by
the bidders’ private information.
3Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2002), Das Varma (2003), Goeree (2003),
Haile (2003), and Molna´r and Vira´g (2008) examine signaling in auctions, but these papers are concerned
with bidders signaling their private information to other bidders so as to affect future strategic interactions.
In contrast, the signaling behavior in our paper is motivated by the structure of the auction game itself:
bidders are interested in signaling their private information to the seller in order to influence the seller’s
choice of winner. In this sense, our paper is more similar to Avery (1998), which addresses the use of jump
bids to signal a high valuation and encourage competing bidders to withdraw.
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matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism can be implemented
without commitment.
If matching is not sufficiently important, a lack of commitment causes the seller to suffer
a loss. As the importance of matching decreases, the impact of associating low bids with a
poor match is diminished. Consequently, the maximum reserve price the seller can credibly
adhere to falls. As the gap between the prescribed reserve and the actual reserve widens,
the seller’s expected utility decreases. Hence, reducing the importance of matching raises
the seller’s value for commitment.
In sum, we find that once the reserve price has been set, the seller need not account for
matching in his allocation decision since the optimal outcome can be achieved via a first-
price auction. If matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism can
be implemented without commitment. However, if matching is not sufficiently important,
commitment power is needed in order to adhere to the prescribed reserve price. As the
importance of matching decreases, the power to commit becomes more valuable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
In Section 3, we solve for the optimal mechanism and show that it can be implemented by
a first-price auction. In Section 4, we derive a set of conditions under which the optimal
outcome can be achieved without commitment. Section 5 characterizes the relationship
between the importance of matching and the value of commitment. Concluding remarks are
offered in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the appendices.
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2 The Model
A seller offers a contract n risk-neutral bidders (n ≥ 2). Every potential pairing of seller and
bidder has an associated match. We denote the match between the seller and bidder i by
θi ∈
[
θ, θ
] ⊂ R, where θi > θj indicates that bidder i has a better match than bidder j does.
We assume the θi’s are independently and identically distributed according to a commonly
known cumulative distribution function (cdf) F with F (θ) = 0 and F
(
θ
)
= 1.
Assumption 1 F has positive density f at every θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Bidder i’s utility from contracting with the seller is
θi − bi,
where θi is bidder i’s value for the contract and bi ∈ R is the bid submitted by bidder i.
Bidder i’s utility is zero if he does not win the contract.
The seller derives utility from both the bid payment and his match with the winning
bidder. We assume the seller’s utility from contracting with bidder i is
V (θi) + bi,
where V (θi) represents the seller’s value for his match with bidder i. The following assump-
tion captures the notion that a good match raises the value of the contract for both the seller
and the bidder:
Assumption 2 V :
[
θ, θ
]→ R is continuous and strictly increasing over [θ, θ].
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The seller’s utility is zero if he does not contract with any bidder.4
The following assumption is imposed so as not to rule out the possibility of a mutually
beneficial trade:
Assumption 3 (participation condition) V
(
θ
)
+ θ is positive.
Additionally, we impose the following regularity condition:
Assumption 4 (regularity condition) The function
V (θi) + θi − 1− F (θi)
f (θi)
is strictly increasing over
[
θ, θ
]
.5
We assume bidder i is better informed about his match than the seller is. Bidder i
observes his match θi but not the matches of his opponents.
6 The seller does not observe the
matches directly, and therefore, his beliefs about the matches are determined by the prior,
F , and the observed bids.
3 The Optimal Mechanism
Intuition suggests that if matching affects the seller’s expected utility, the seller should
account for matching in his allocation decision. In fact, we observe this behavior in a number
4When V (θi) = vθi, where v is a positive constant, our model can be mapped to the interdependent
valuations framework outlined in Section 5 of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001): simply let the agents be indexed
by i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n}, where agent i is the seller if i = 0 and bidder i otherwise; let pik be the probability the
contract is awarded to agent i in alternative k; and let s0 = 0, si = θi, aik0 = vp
i
k, a
i
ki = p
i
k, and a
j
ki = 0 for
all j 6= i.
5Note that Assumption 4 is less restrictive than the monotone hazard rate condition.
6Bidder i’s beliefs about θj , j 6= i, are determined by the prior, F .
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of environments. For example, PDVSA accounted for technological complementarities in its
selection of partners for the development of marginal oil fields while novelist Charles Frazier
accounted for his compatibility with the editor in his choice of a publisher. In this section, we
ask whether the seller should account for matching in allocating the contract. Our approach
will be to solve for the optimal mechanism and then identify which allocation rules implement
it.
By appealing to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1981), we restrict attention to direct
revelation mechanisms {p(·), t(·)}, where pi :
[
θ, θ
]n → [0, 1] is the probability that bidder
i is awarded the contract and ti :
[
θ, θ
]n → R is the expected transfer from bidder i to the
seller.
If bidder i observes his type θi but announces that his type is x, his expected utility from
the mechanism {p(·), t(·)} is
Ui (x, θi) ≡ Eθ−i [θipi (x, θ−i)− ti (x, θ−i)] . (3.1)
Similarly, the seller’s expected utility from the mechanism is
U0 ≡ Eθ
[
n∑
i=1
V (θi) pi(θ) +
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
. (3.2)
The mechanism is optimal if it maximizes U0 subject to
Incentive compatibility (IC): Ui (θi, θi) ≥ Ui (x, θi) ∀i, ∀θi,∀x;
Individual rationality (IR): Ui (θi, θi) ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀θi;
and
pi(θ) ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 pi(θ) ≤ 1 ∀i,∀θ.
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Proposition 1 The optimal mechanism satisfies
pi(θ) =
{
1 if θi ≥ θj ∀j and θi ≥ θ∗
0 otherwise
and
Eθ−i [ti (θi, θ−i)] =
{
θi F
n−1(θi)−
∫ θi
θ∗ F
n−1(x) dx if θi ≥ θ∗
0 otherwise
where
θ∗ =

{
x ∈ (θ, θ ) : V (x) + x = 1− F (x)
f(x)
}
if V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
θ otherwise
Proof See Appendix A.
The proof follows Myerson (1981). It develops a relaxed optimization program by reducing
the number of choice variables from two to one. The unique solution of the relaxed program
is identified and shown to satisfy the constraints of the original program. The regularity
condition plays a key role.
As in Myerson, the optimal mechanism can be implemented via a standard first-price
sealed-bid auction with an appropriate choice of reserve price. Since a bidder with a higher
match has a higher value for the contract, well matched bidders can afford to bid more than
poorly matched bidders. Hence, a rule that allocates the contract to the highest bidder also
allocates the contract to the bidder with the best match.
To the extent that the seller allocates the contract to the bidder who submits the highest
price offer, matching does not figure into the allocation decision. Note that this result holds
no matter how important matching may be to the seller.
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However, matching does factor into the reserve price prescribed by the optimal mecha-
nism, and this is where our result differs from Myerson’s. There are two reasons why in-
troducing matching into the seller’s utility function affects the optimal reserve price. First,
matching may affect the minimum type for which a mutually beneficial trade exists. In
Myerson’s framework, that type is simply θ = 0, but in our framework, that type is given
by V (θ) + θ = 0. If V (0) > 0, the minimum type is lower in our framework, and hence, the
optimal reserve price is lower as well. The converse is true if V (0) < 0.
Second, matching may affect the trade-off between allocative efficiency and extraction of
informational rents. Suppose the minimum type for which there exists a mutually beneficial
trade is the same in our framework as it is in Myerson’s framework; that is, suppose V (0) = 0.
Since V is strictly increasing, V (θ) + θ > θ for all θ > 0. In other words, the surplus lost by
failing to contract when a mutually beneficial trade exists is greater in our framework than
in Myerson’s. It follows that the optimal reserve price is lower in our framework. Moreover,
the more the seller cares about matching (i.e., the higher V ′), the greater the surplus lost
and the lower the optimal reserve price.
In sum, the seller should account for matching in allocating the contract but only with
respect to the choice of reserve price. Once the reserve price is set, the seller can do away
with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone.
4 Implementation under No Commitment
We now turn our attention to the case in which the seller lacks commitment power. Our
objective is to determine whether the optimal mechanism can be implemented under such
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conditions. In the previous section, we showed that a first-price auction with an elevated
reserve price is optimal. However, there are several reasons to believe that commitment is
needed to carry out this auction. First, it is not apparent that the elevated reserve can be
sustained: the seller may prefer contracting with a well-matched bidder whose offer falls
short of the reserve to not contracting at all.
The second reason is more subtle. In the previous section, we saw that awarding the
contract to the highest bidder automatically delivers the bidder with the best match. Con-
sequently, the seller has no incentive to contract with anyone other than the highest bidder.
However, this result is predicated on the bidders believing the seller is committed to car-
rying out the rules of the first-price auction. If the seller’s inability to commit is common
knowledge, the bidders may alter their bidding strategies accordingly. Once this adjustment
takes place, the highest bidder may no longer be the one with the best match. In this case,
the seller may find that he prefers to contract with another bidder whose bid is lower but
expected match is higher. In other words, the seller may find himself reneging on the rules
of the first-price auction.
The important point is that if it is known that the seller lacks commitment power, bidders
ignore the announced allocation rule and assume the seller will award the contract to the
bidder who offers the most attractive combination of price and expected match, provided
that offer exceeds the seller’s reservation utility. That is, bidders select their strategies as if
they are playing the following game:
1. Each bidder submits a price offer independently and simultaneously.
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2. The seller contracts with the bidder whose combination of price and expected match
maximizes the seller’s expected utility provided that the combined value is not less
than the seller’s reservation utility of zero. That is, bidder i wins the contract if
E [V (θi) | bi] + bi ≥ 0
and
E [V (θi) | bi] + bi > E [V (θj) | bj] + bj ∀j 6= i,
where bi denotes the price offer (bid) submitted by bidder i. Ties are resolved by a
random draw with equal probability.
3. If the contract is allocated to bidder i, θi is revealed. The seller’s utility is V (θi) + bi,
bidder i’s utility is θi − bi, and all other bidders get zero utility. If the contract is not
allocated, every agent gets zero utility.
We call this game a first-score auction, where the term “score” refers to the combination
of price and expected match. For instance, bidder i’s score is given by E [V (θi) | bi] + bi.
As indicated in the timeline above, the contract is allocated to the bidder with the highest
score provided that the score is nonnegative. The winning bidder pays the price he offered
bi, thereby delivering his true score V (θi) + bi.
A first-score auction is similar to a first-price auction in that bidders make price offers
and the winning bidder pays his bid. However, while the winner in a first-price auction is the
bidder who submits the highest price offer, the winner in a first-score auction is the bidder
who submits the most attractive combination of price and expected match. This allocation
13
rule allows the seller to reject an offer made by the highest bidder and allocate the contract to
another bidder whose pairing of bid and expected match is more attractive than the pairing
offered by the highest bidder. Moreover, the first-score auction does not feature an elevated
reserve price: the seller retains the contract only when every offer falls short of the seller’s
reservation utility. Since the allocation rule of the first-score auction reflects the seller’s true
preferences, there is no incentive for the seller to deviate from it after observing the bids.
Our use of a first-score auction to represent the seller’s lack of commitment is consistent
with the literature. Che (1993) states that in the absence of commitment “the only feasible
scoring rule is one that reflects the seller’s [true] preference ordering,” and Rezende (forth-
coming) allows a seller without commitment power to renege on the announced allocation
rule and select the auction winner arbitrarily. Our representation is also consistent with the
principal-agent model in Bester and Strausz (2000): they define imperfect commitment in
terms of a two-stage game, in which agents select messages in the first stage and the principal
updates his beliefs and selects an allocation in the second stage.
Our approach will be to investigate the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the first-score
auction to see whether the optimal mechanism outlined in Proposition 1 can be implemented
in the absence of commitment. Recall that the optimal mechanism allocates the contract
to the bidder with the best match. Hence, if the first-score auction implements the optimal
mechanism, the equilibrium bidding strategies must be such that the seller can distinguish
between bidders of different types. For this reason, we elect to focus on separating equilibria.
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The following lemma characterizes the symmetric separating equilibria of the first-score
auction game.
Lemma 1 In any symmetric separating equilibrium of the first-score auction game, there
exists a t∗ ∈ [ θ, θ ] such that
(1) any bidder with type θ ∈ (t∗, θ ] bids according to the function
b(θ) = θ −
∫ θ
t∗ F
n−1(x) dx
F n−1(θ)
and wins with positive probability.
(2) any bidder with type θ ∈ [ θ, t∗) wins with zero probability.
Proof See Lamping (2008).
Lemma 1 indicates that equilibrium bids increase with the quality of the match over the
range [t∗, θ ]. Since a better match implies a higher value for the contract, well matched
bidders can credibly signal their favored status by offering higher bids. The contract is thus
awarded to the bidder with the highest type – as prescribed by the optimal mechanism.
Moreover, the bidding function specified by Lemma 1 is identical to the equilibrium bid-
ding function in a first-price auction with a reserve price of t∗. The equivalency follows
from the fact that when higher bids signal higher types, the allocation rule for the first-score
auction coincides with the allocation rule for the first-price auction. Since the optimal mech-
anism can be implemented by a first-price auction, it appears that the optimal mechanism
may be implementable by a first-score auction as well.
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The issue is that the absence of commitment power may affect the feasibility of adhering
to the threshold prescribed by the optimal mechanism:
θ∗ =

{
x ∈ (θ, θ ) : V (x) + x = 1− F (x)
f(x)
}
if V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
θ otherwise
(4.1)
Suppose V (θ)+ θ <
1
f(θ)
. It follows from Assumptions 3 and 4 that V (θ∗)+ θ∗ > 0. Hence,
we encounter the usual problem associated with an elevated threshold: if a bidder with type
θ∗− ² has the highest type and bids his valuation, the seller will prefer to award the contract
and earn V (θ∗ − ²) + θ∗ − ² than to retain the contract and earn zero.
Note that the preceding argument hinges on the seller knowing the bidder’s type. Sup-
pose, once again, that a bidder with type θ∗ − ² has the highest type and bids his valuation
but imagine that the seller believes (incorrectly) that this bidder has type θ. In this case,
the seller expects that contracting with this bidder will yield V (θ) + θ∗ − ². If V (θ) ≤ −θ∗,
the seller will prefer to retain the contract and earn zero than to award the contract and earn
V (θ)+ θ∗− ² < 0. This suggests that an elevated threshold can be sustained if the seller (1)
associates bids that fall short of the threshold with a poor match and (2) finds contracting
with a poorly matched bidder to be sufficiently unfavorable. We formalize this notion in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let θ∗ be defined as in Proposition 1.
(1) If either V (θ)+θ ≥ 1
f(θ)
or V (θ)+θ∗ ≤ 0, there is a symmetric separating equilibrium
of the first-score auction game that implements the optimal mechanism.
16
(2) If V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
and V (θ) + θ∗ > 0, there is no symmetric separating equilib-
rium of the first-score auction game that implements the optimal mechanism. The
symmetric separating equilibrium that maximizes the seller’s expected utility has t∗ =
max{θ,−V (θ)}.
Proof See Appendix B.
If V (θ)+θ ≥ 1
f(θ)
, the surplus generated by contracting with the lowest type θ is so large
that it is optimal for the seller to allow every bidder to participate. Since there is no elevated
threshold to be sustained, the optimal mechanism can be implemented without commitment.
If V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
, the optimal mechanism does prescribe an elevated threshold. Suppose
V (θ) + θ∗ ≤ 0 and note that this condition can be rewritten as
V (θ∗)− V (θ) ≥ 1− F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
. (4.2)
Proposition 2 establishes that if matching is sufficiently important to the seller (i.e., if the
range of V is sufficiently large), the impact of punishing off-equilibrium-path beliefs is sub-
stantial enough to sustain the prescribed threshold. Hence, the optimal mechanism can be
implemented without commitment.
However, if neither V (θ)+θ ≥ 1
f(θ)
nor V (θ)+θ∗ ≤ 0, the optimal mechanism cannot be
implemented by a first-score auction. In this case, the prescribed threshold is elevated, but
matching is not important enough for even the most punishing off-equilibrium-path beliefs
to sustain it. The highest threshold that can be sustained is t∗ = max{θ,−V (θ)}.
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In sum, if matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism can
be implemented without commitment.7 This may explain why we observe agents, such as
PDVSA and Charles Frazier, who are able to commit to a different allocation mechanism,
simply implementing a first-score auction. If matching is not sufficiently important, the seller
may be unable to implement the optimal mechanism without commitment.
5 The Value of Commitment
In this section, we seek to more explicitly characterize the relationship between the impor-
tance of matching and the value of commitment. In order to do so, we introduce some
additional notation. Let V A : [θ, θ] → R and V B : [θ, θ] → R be two functions satisfying
Assumptions 2, 3, and 4. Let θA∗ and θ
B
∗ be the optimal thresholds associated with V
A and
V B respectively. In addition, let
tk∗ =

θk∗ if V
k(θ) + θ ≥ 1
f(θ)
or V k(θ) + θ∗ ≤ 0
max
{
θ ,−V k(θ)} otherwise (5.1)
and
tk =
{ {
x ∈ (θ, θ ) : V k(x) + x = 0} if V k(θ) + θ < 0
θ otherwise
(5.2)
7This result is predicated on the game having a single period. In an intertemporal model, the Coase
conjecture would apply (Coase, 1972). If every bid were to fall short of the reserve price, the seller would
retain the contract and update his beliefs about the distribution of types. In the following period, he would
offer the contract again but set a lower reserve price. If the bidders were sufficiently patient, they would
simply wait for the reserve to fall to a suitable level. Thus, in an intertemporal model, the seller does suffer
a loss due to his inability to commit. Note that the issue is the reserve price and not the scoring system.
Even in an intertemporal model, a higher bid signals a better match. Therefore, there is no loss associated
with selecting the winner on the basis of both price and match instead of price alone. For a more formal
treatment of the Coase conjecture, see Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986),
and Hart and Tirole (1988). McAfee and Vincent (1997), Skreta (2007), and Vartiainen (2007) specifically
address the application of the Coase conjecture to auctions.
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where k ∈ {A,B}. Note that tk∗ represents the optimal sustainable threshold and that tk
represents the lowest type for which there exists a mutually beneficial trade. A straight-
forward application of the methodology in Riley and Samuelson (1981) yields the following
expression for the seller’s expected utility when the lowest participating type is tk∗:
n
∫ θ
tk∗
[
V k(x) + x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
]
F n−1(x) f(x) dx , k ∈ {A,B}. (5.3)
The loss associated with the seller’s lack of commitment power can then be written as
Ck ≡ −n
∫ θk∗
tk∗
[
V k(x) + x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
]
F n−1(x) f(x) dx , k ∈ {A,B}. (5.4)
We are now ready to specify the relationship between the importance of matching and the
value of commitment.
Proposition 3 Suppose V A and V B satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) V A(tA) = V B(tB),
(2)
dV A(θ)
dθ
<
dV B(θ)
dθ
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ ], and
(3) V A(θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
and V A(θ) + θA∗ > 0 .
Then CA > CB.
Proof See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 establishes that if we (1) hold fixed the range of types for which there exists
a mutually beneficial trade and (2) increase the importance of matching, the seller’s value
for commitment decreases. Increasing the importance of matching has several effects. First,
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it magnifies the impact of associating low bids with a poor match. As a result, the optimal
sustainable threshold increases (tA∗ < t
B
∗ ). Second, it magnifies the loss associated with
retaining the contract when a mutually beneficial trade exists. This reduces the threshold
prescribed by the optimal mechanism (θA∗ > θ
B
∗ ). Finally, it raises the seller’s value for any
particular match provided that a mutually beneficial trade with that match exists (V A(θ) <
V B(θ) for all θ > t ). Every one of these three effects serves to reduce the loss associated
with the seller’s lack of commitment power.
6 Concluding Remarks
For a wide range of commercial arrangements, a good match between the buyer and seller
raises the value of the contract for both parties. However, at the time the terms of the
contract are set, the parties may not be fully informed about the degree to which they
match. In this paper, we have addressed the case in which the quality of the match is the
private information of the bidder.
The paper opened by asking whether the seller should account for matching in his allo-
cation decision. It is shown that once the reserve price is set, the seller can do away with
any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. Since
the bidder’s value for the contract increases with the quality of his match with the seller,
allocating the contract to the highest bidder is equivalent to selecting the bidder with the
best match.
We then ask whether commitment is required to implement the optimal mechanism. We
argue that a seller who lacks commitment power simply awards the contract to the bidder
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who offers the most attractive combination of price and expected match. Since well matched
bidders have a higher value for the contract, higher bids signal higher matches. As a result,
the seller has no incentive to contract with anyone other than the highest bidder.
The issue is that commitment may be necessary to sustain the elevated threshold pre-
scribed by the optimal mechanism. We show that if matching is sufficiently important to
the seller, the prescribed threshold can be sustained by associating bids that fall below the
threshold with a poor match. However, if matching is not sufficiently important, the seller
cannot adhere to the prescribed threshold and suffers a loss. As the importance of matching
decreases, the magnitude of the loss increases, and commitment becomes more valuable.
We conclude with a few remarks on potential avenues for further research. Given the
attention paid to commitment, one logical extension would be to allow for multiple periods.
Clearly, our results would be unaffected for the case in which the seller can commit. However,
our results for the case in which the seller lacks commitment power would change. In Section
4, we found that the optimal mechanism could be implemented without commitment if (1)
the seller associated bids that fell short of the prescribed threshold with a poor match and
(2) matching was sufficiently important to the seller. However, with multiple periods, the
seller has an opportunity to update his beliefs about the matches over time. In the absence
of commitment, the Coase conjecture applies making it impossible to sustain the prescribed
threshold in the long run. Hence, if bidders are sufficiently patient, the optimal mechanism
cannot be implemented.8
8For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Footnote 7.
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Another desirable extension would be to allow both the bidder and seller to observe a
signal about the quality of their match. In the commitment case, we would have an informed
principal problem with common values along the lines of Maskin and Tirole (1992) but with
multiple heterogeneous agents. Solving the mechanism design problem would be particularly
challenging because one would have to contend with both an informed principal problem
and an asymmetric auctions problem. For the non-commitment case, this paper provides a
starting point in that it offers a characterization of non-commitment (the first-score auction)
and shows that in this setting, bidders have an incentive to reveal favorable information via
higher bids. Developing these ideas further would be an interesting area for future research.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows Myerson (1981). We first show that if the mechanism {p(·), t(·)} is optimal,
then Ui(θ, θ) = 0. We then develop a relaxed optimization program and find its solution.
After noting that the solution of the relaxed program coincides with the mechanism outlined
in Proposition 1, we demonstrate that the mechanism satisfies the constraints of the original
program.
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Suppose the mechanism {p(·), t(·)} satisfies the IC and IR constraints for all θi ∈
[
θ, θ
]
but
that Ui(θ, θ) = ² > 0. Now consider a different mechanism
{
p(·), tˆ(·)}, where tˆi(·) ≡ ti(·)+ ².
The mechanism
{
p(·), tˆ(·)} satisfies the IR constraint for all θi ∈ [θ, θ] since
Ûi (θi, θi) = Eθ−i
[
θipi (θi, θ−i)− tˆi (θi, θ−i)
]
= Eθ−i [θipi (θi, θ−i)− ti (θi, θ−i)]− ²
≥ Eθ−i [θipi (θ, θ−i)− ti (θ, θ−i)]− ²
≥ Eθ−i [θpi (θ, θ−i)− ti (θ, θ−i)]− ²
= 0.
(A.1)
The first inequality holds because {p(·), t(·)} satisfies the IC constraint; the second inequality
holds because pi ∈ [0, 1]. The mechanism
{
p(·), tˆ(·)} also satisfies the IC constraint for all
θi ∈
[
θ, θ
]
since
Ûi (θi, θi) = Eθ−i [θipi (θi, θ−i)− ti (θi, θ−i)]− ²
≥ Eθ−i [θipi (x, θ−i)− ti (x, θ−i)]− ²
= Uˆi (x, θi)
(A.2)
for all x ∈ [θ, θ]. The inequality follows from the fact that {p(·), t(·)} satisfies the IC
constraint. Since ² > 0 and tˆi(·) ≡ ti(·) + ², the seller’s expected utility is strictly greater
under
{
p(·), tˆ(·)} than it is under {p(·), t(·)}. Therefore, the original mechanism {p(·), t(·)}
cannot be optimal – a contradiction.
Having established that Ui(θ, θ) = 0, we turn our attention to developing a relaxed
optimization program. Our approach is to modify the original program so as to reduce the
number of choice variables from two, p(·) and t(·), to one, p(·). From equation (3.1), we have
Eθ−i [ti (θi, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [θipi (θi, θ−i)]− Ui (θi, θi) , (A.3)
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and after substituting for Eθ−i [ti (θi, θ−i)] in equation (3.2), we obtain
U0 = Eθ
[
n∑
i=1
(V (θi) + θi) pi(θ)
]
−
n∑
i=1
Eθi [Ui (θi, θi)] . (A.4)
It remains to develop an expression for Eθi [Ui (θi, θi)] in terms of pi(θ).
Incentive compatibility requires that Ui (θi, θi) ≥ Ui (x, θi) for all θi ∈
[
θ, θ
]
and all
x ∈ [θ, θ]. Subtracting Ui(x, x) from both sides and applying equation (3.1) yields
Ui (θi, θi)− Ui (x, x) ≥ (θi − x)Eθ−i [pi (x, θ−i)] . (A.5)
Since this inequality holds for all θi ∈
[
θ, θ
]
and all x ∈ [θ, θ], it must be the case that
(θi − x)Ri(x) ≤ U˜i (θi)− U˜i (x) ≤ (θi − x)Ri(θi), (A.6)
where Ri(x) ≡ Eθ−i [pi (x, θ−i)] and U˜i(x) ≡ Ui (x, x).
Suppose θi > x and let δ ≡ θi − x. Then inequality (A.6) can be rewritten as follows:
Ri(x) ≤ U˜i (x+ δ)− U˜i (x)
δ
≤ Ri(x+ δ). (A.7)
Since Ri(·) is nondecreasing, it is Riemann integrable. Hence,∫ θi
θ
Ri (x) dx = U˜i (θi)− U˜i (θ) . (A.8)
After substituting for Ri(x), U˜i (θi), and U˜i (θ) and applying our earlier result, Ui(θ, θ) = 0,
we obtain
Ui (θi, θi) =
∫ θi
θ
Eθ−i [pi (x, θ−i)] dx. (A.9)
Taking the expectation of Ui (θi, θi) and integrating by parts yields the expression we seek:
Eθi [Ui (θi, θi)] = Eθ
[
1− F (θi)
f (θi)
pi(θ)
]
. (A.10)
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Using equation (A.10), we substitute for Eθi [Ui (θi, θi)] in equation (A.4) and obtain an
expression for U0 in terms of p(·). The resulting relaxed program is as follows:
max
{p(·)}
Eθ
[
n∑
i=1
(
V (θi) + θi − 1− F (θi)
f (θi)
)
pi(θ)
]
subject to
pi(θ) ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
pi(θ) ≤ 1 ∀i,∀θ.
Since V (θi) + θi − 1− F (θi)
f (θi)
is strictly increasing by Assumption 4, the unique solution of
the relaxed program is
pi(θ) =

1 if θi ≥ θj ∀j and V (θi) + θi − 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
≥ 0
0 otherwise
Note that the expression above coincides with the pi(θ) outlined in Proposition 1. We
proceed by deriving the associated t(·) and verifying that it too coincides with Proposition
1. From equation (A.3) we have
Eθ−i [ti (θi, θ−i)] = θiEθ−i [pi (θi, θ−i)]− Ui (θi, θi) . (A.11)
After substituting for Ui (θi, θi) using equation (A.9) and replacing pi (θi, θ−i) with the solu-
tion of the relaxed program, we obtain
Eθ−i [ti (θi, θ−i)] =

θi F
n−1 (θi)−
∫ θi
θ∗ F
n−1(x) dx if V (θi) + θi ≥ 1− F (θi)
f (θi)
0 otherwise
which clearly coincides with the corresponding expression in Proposition 1.
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It remains to show that the mechanism {p(·), t(·)} satisfies the constraints of the original
program. The IR constraint, pi(θ) ≥ 0, and
∑n
i=1 pi(θ) ≤ 1 are satisfied trivially. To verify
that the IC constraint holds, we must show that
Ui (θi, θi) ≥ Ui (x, θi) (A.12)
for all θi ∈
[
θ, θ
]
and all x ∈ [θ, θ]. Subtracting Ui(x, x) from both sides and applying
equation (3.1) yields
Ui (θi, θi)− Ui (x, x) ≥ (θi − x)Eθ−i [pi (x, θ−i)] . (A.13)
If θi and x are less than θ∗, the inequality is trivially satisfied. If θi < θ∗ and x ≥ θ∗, the
left-hand side is
Ui (θi, θi)− Ui (x, x) = −
∫ x
θ∗ F
n−1(y) dy
≥ − (x− θ∗)F n−1(x)
≥ − (x− θi)F n−1(x)
= (θi − x)Eθ−i [pi (x, θ−i)]
(A.14)
and the inequality is again satisfied. If θi ≥ θ∗ and x < θ∗, the inequality reduces to∫ θi
θ∗ F
n−1(y) dy ≥ 0, which is trivially satisfied. If θi ≥ x ≥ θ∗,
Ui (θi, θi)− Ui(x, x) =
∫ θi
x
F n−1(y) dy
≥ (θi − x)F n−1(x)
= (θi − x)Eθ−i [pi (x, θ−i)]
(A.15)
An analogous argument can be used to verify that the inequality holds if x ≥ θi ≥ θ∗. ¥
B Proof of Proposition 2
The proof exploits the following result from Lamping (2008):
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Lemma 2 A symmetric separating equilibrium exists for every t∗ ∈ [ t, t ], where
t =
{ {
x ∈ (θ, θ ) : V (x) + x = 0} if V (θ) + θ < 0
θ otherwise
and
t = min
{
t+ [V (t)− V (θ)] , θ } .
Moreover, there are no symmetric separating equilibria such that t∗ /∈ [ t, t ].
To verify part (1) of Proposition 2, we will show that θ∗ ∈ [ t, t ] whenever V (θ)+θ ≥ 1
f(θ)
or V (θ) + θ∗ ≤ 0. Suppose first that V (θ) + θ ≥ 1
f(θ)
. By Assumption 1,
1
f(θ)
> 0. It
follows that t = t = θ and that θ∗ = θ . Clearly, θ∗ ∈ [ t, t ]. Now suppose that V (θ)+θ∗ ≤ 0.
V (θ) + θ∗ ≤ 0 implies V (θ) + θ ≤ 0 . It follows that t satisfies V (t) + t = 0 . Similarly,
V (θ) + θ ≤ 0 implies V (θ) + θ < 1
f(θ)
. It follows that θ∗ satisfies
V (θ∗) + θ∗ =
1− F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
. (B.1)
By Assumption 1,
1− F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
> 0 . Since V (t) + t = 0 , V (θ∗) + θ∗ > 0 , and V (x) + x is
increasing in x (by Assumption 2), it must be the case that θ∗ > t . In addition, V (t)+ t = 0
implies that t = min{−V (θ), θ }. If t = θ , θ∗ must be less than or equal to t. If t = −V (θ),
it is still the case that θ∗ ≤ t since V (θ) + θ∗ ≤ 0. Having shown that θ∗ > t and θ∗ ≤ t , we
assert that θ∗ ∈ [ t, t ].
We will now verify part (2) of Proposition 2. We begin by showing that θ∗ > t whenever
V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
and V (θ) + θ∗ > 0. Suppose first that V (θ) + θ ≤ 0 so that t satisfies
V (t) + t = 0. In this case, t = min{−V (θ), θ }. Since V (θ) + θ∗ > 0, it must be the case
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that V (θ) + θ > 0. It follows that t = −V (θ). Since V (θ) + θ∗ > 0, θ∗ > t . Now suppose
that V (θ) + θ > 0 so that t = θ . In this case, t = θ . Since V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
, θ∗ > θ = t .
Having shown that θ∗ > t , we will now show that the seller’s expected utility increases
in t∗ over the range [ t, t ]. By applying the methodology in Riley and Samuelson (1981) to
Lemma 1, we obtain the following expression for the seller’s expected utility:
n
∫ θ
t∗
[
V (x) + x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
]
F n−1(x) f(x) dx . (B.2)
Taking the derivative with respect to t∗ yields
−n
[
V (t∗) + t∗ − 1− F (t∗)
f(t∗)
]
F n−1(t∗) f(t∗) . (B.3)
Since θ∗ > t, the expression V (t∗) + t∗ − 1− F (t∗)
f(t∗)
is negative for all t∗ ∈ [ t, t ]. Hence,
expression (B.3) is positive if t∗ ∈ ( t, t ] or t∗ = t > θ and zero if t∗ = t = θ . It follows
that the symmetric separating equilibrium that maximizes the seller’s expected utility has
t∗ = t .
To complete the proof, we derive an expression for t given that V (θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
and
V (θ)+ θ∗ > 0. It was shown earlier that t = −V (θ) when V (θ)+ θ ≤ 0 and that t = θ when
V (θ) + θ > 0 . These observations can be summarized as follows: t = max{θ,−V (θ)} . ¥
C Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in three parts. We first show that V A(tA) = V B(tB) implies tA = tB. It
follows that V A(θ) < V B(θ) for all θ ∈ (tA, θ ]. We then show that θA∗ > θB∗ and that either
tB∗ ≥ tA∗ or tB∗ = θB∗ . The final part combines these results to demonstrate that CA > CB.
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Suppose that V k(θ) + θ ≤ 0 for all k ∈ {A,B}. In this case, V A(tA) + tA = 0 and
V B(tB) + tB = 0. Since V A(tA) = V B(tB), it must be the case that tA = tB. Now suppose
that V k(θ) + θ < 0 for all k ∈ {A,B}. In this case, tA = θ and tB = θ . Hence, tA = tB.
Finally, suppose that V k(θ) + θ ≤ 0 for some k ∈ {A,B} but that V `(θ) + θ > 0 for ` 6= k.
In this case, t` = θ while tk satisfies V k(tk) + tk = 0. Since V k(tk) = V `(t`) and tk ≥ t`,
we have V k(tk) + tk ≥ V `(t`) + t`. However, since V k(tk) + tk = 0, it must be the case
that V `(t`) + t` ≤ 0, which contradicts our initial assumption that V `(θ) + θ > 0. The
contradiction allows us to rule out this final case. Having shown that tA = tB, we drop
the superscript and let t denote both tA and tB. The combination of V A(t) = V B(t) and
dV A(θ)
dθ
<
dV B(θ)
dθ
imply that V A(θ) < V B(θ) for all θ ∈ (t, θ ].
We will now show that θA∗ > θ
B
∗ . Since V
A(θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
, θA∗ exceeds θ and satisfies
V A(θA∗ ) + θ
A
∗ −
1− F (θA∗ )
f(θA∗ )
= 0. (C.1)
By applying Assumption 1, we obtain θA∗ > t . Suppose V
B(θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
. It follows that
θB∗ exceeds θ and satisfies
V B(θB∗ ) + θ
B
∗ −
1− F (θB∗ )
f(θB∗ )
= 0. (C.2)
By applying Assumption 1, we obtain θB∗ > t . Since V
A(θ) < V B(θ) for all θ ∈ (t, θ ] and
since both V A and V B satisfy Assumption 4, we have θA∗ > θ
B
∗ . Now suppose V
B(θ) + θ ≥
1
f(θ)
. In this case, θB∗ = θ . Since θ
A
∗ > θ , we have θ
A
∗ > θ
B
∗ .
Having established that θA∗ > θ
B
∗ , we show that either t
B
∗ ≥ tA∗ or tB∗ = θB∗ . Since
V A(θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
and V A(θ) + θA∗ > 0, we have t
A
∗ = max{θ,−V A(θ)}. If tA∗ = θ , tB∗ ≥ tA∗ .
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Now suppose tA∗ = −V A(θ). Note that this implies V A(θ) + θ ≤ 0. If tB∗ 6= θB∗ , we have
tB∗ = max{θ,−V B(θ)}. Since V A(t) = V B(t) and
dV A(θ)
dθ
<
dV B(θ)
dθ
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ ], it
must be the case that V A(θ) ≥ V B(θ). V A(θ) + θ ≤ 0 then implies V B(θ) + θ ≤ 0, which
implies tB∗ = −V B(θ). Since −V B(θ) ≥ −V A(θ), tB∗ ≥ tA∗ .
We have established that (1) V B(θ) > V A(θ) for all θ ∈ (t, θ ], (2) θB∗ < θA∗ , and (3)
either tB∗ ≥ tA∗ or tB∗ = θB∗ . We will now exploit these results to demonstrate that CA > CB.
Recall that
Ck ≡ −n
∫ θk∗
tk∗
[
V k(x) + x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
]
F n−1(x) f(x) dx , k ∈ {A,B}. (C.3)
Since V A(θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
and V A(θ) + θA∗ > 0, we have t
A
∗ = max{θ,−V A(θ)}. In addition,
V A(θ) + θ <
1
f(θ)
implies θA∗ > θ , and V
A(θ) + θA∗ > 0 implies θ
A
∗ > −V A(θ). It follows
that θA∗ > t
A
∗ . Since V
A(x) + x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
is negative for all x ∈ [tA∗ , θA∗ ), CA > 0.
Suppose tB∗ 6= θB∗ . In this case, tB∗ ≥ tA∗ , which allows us to write [tB∗ , θB∗ ] ⊂ [tA∗ , θA∗ ].
Recall that tA∗ = max{θ,−V A(θ)}. If V A(θ) + θ ≥ 0, tA∗ = θ and t = θ . If V A(θ) + θ < 0,
tA∗ = −V A(θ) and t = −V A(t). In either case, tA∗ ≥ t . It follows from Condition (1) that
V B(θ) > V A(θ) for all θ ∈ (tA∗ , θA∗ ]. Since [tB∗ , θB∗ ] ⊂ [tA∗ , θA∗ ] and V B(θ) > V A(θ) for all
θ ∈ (tA∗ , θA∗ ], we have CA > CB. Now suppose tB∗ = θB∗ . In this case, CB = 0. Since CA > 0,
we have CA > CB. ¥
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